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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, an<l
DESERET INVESTORS
GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
BEA VER COUNTY, a legislative

corporation of the State of Utah, HYRUM L. LEE, EUGENE H.
l\IA YER, HOVV j_\HD .T. PRYOR,
coustituting the Hoard of Commissioners of Be~wer County,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11318

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
APPELLANTS' STATEMENT
OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Case No. 11318 was consolidated for trial with
Case No. 11317 and is an action brought by Phillips
Petroleum Company and Deseret Investors Group, Inc.,
1

attacking ( 1) a zoning resolution adopted by Beaver
County, and ( 2) the validity of the resolution as applied to the Plaintiffs' property.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The trial court ( C. Nelson Day) held in a memorandum decision that ( 1) the zoning resolution of Beaver County is valid and is valid as applied to the Plaintiffs' properties, ( 2) the Board of County Commissioners of Beaver County did not act unreasonably in
denying the Plaintiffs' petition to amend the ordinance
and reclassify Plaintiffs' properties, and ( 3) that the
Defendants are entitled to judgment of no cause of
action.
From this decision, the Plaintiffs have appealed,
as has Chevron Oil Company in the companion case.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Phillips Petroleum Company and Deseret Investors Group, Inc., seek on this appeal to have this Court
reverse the trial court, and determine that the zoning
resolution adopted by Beaver County is ( 1) invalid on
its face, and ( 2) is invalid as applied to the Plaintiffs'
properties.
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lDBNTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND
EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS
Phillips Petroleum Company, a Delaware Corporation and Deseret Investors Group, Inc., a Utah Corporation, were Plaintiffs below in Case No. 11318 and
are Appellants on this Appeal and will hereafter he
referred to as "Phillips" and "Deseret Investors," respectively, or simply as "Plaintiffs."
The Defendants below will be referred to as "BeaYer County," or as "Defendants."
The Plaintiff in the companion case, No. 11317,
CheYro11 Oil Company, doing business as Standard Oil
Company of California, shall be referred to as "CheYron. "
The abbreviations used in this Brief, referring to
parts of the Record, are: ( H) , the hearing before the
Beaver County Commission; ( R) , Record of the case ;
(F), File of Case and (D), as the deposition of Dr.
::Hilton Matthews, which was accepted as part of the
record of the case, by stiuplation of the parties, subject
to certain objections of the Defendants, which were
Oi'erruled by the Court ( R-17 5-6) .

S'l'A'l'E:l\1ENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs in this case join in the Statement of
Facts set out in the Brief of Plaintiff, Chevron, and add
the following particulars:
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90% of Beaver County is gTazing area and, of this,
the forest area is best suited for grazing ( R-337) ; as a
matter of fact, the greater portion of the County can be
classified as desert, except for approximately 200 farm~
scattered throughout the County and three towns: Bea.
ver (population 1,653); Milford (population 1,556) anJ
Minersville ( population 550) ( .F) -336-7, Pre-trial

Order).

On August 2, 1947, under the provisions of the
Federal Highway Act of 1944, the Commissioner of
Public Roads designated the control points for Inter·
state 15 in Utah, i.e. the points through which I-15
would run in the State of Utah (Exhibit 18).
On November 7, 1958, a public hearing was held
in Beaver City, with respect to the exact location of the
Freeway through Beaver County and on August 3.
1959, the Utah State Road Commission approved the
definite and final location of the route of I-15 through
Beaver County (Exhibit 18).
On or about November 26, 1958, the County Com·
mission hired Mr. I. Dale Despain to prepare a zoning
ordinance for Beaver County (R-263) and on May 18,
1959, a Resolution of Zoning was passed by the Bearer
County Commissioners (Exhibit 1) .
On December 6, 1965, a hearing was held before
the Beaver County Commission on Plaintiffs' and
Chevron's Petition for Change of Zoning from "Graz·
ing" to "Highway Service Zone" which Petition was
denied.
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At the time of the trial, approximately 20 miles of
the Freeway had been completed, beginning at the Heaver County line on the North and extending South to
Beaver City, where construction ended (Exhibits H,
15 and 16), but after completion of the Freeway, the
City of Heaver will be bypassed. Interstate 70, which
is an East-\,Y est arm of the Interstate System, begins
in \V ashington, D.C., and passes through Kansas City,
St. Louis and Denver and ends when it connects onto
l-15, at the Cove Fort Interchange, located in Millard
County, approximately three miles North of Pine Creek
Interchange ( H-28). There are only one or two other
places in the entire Interstate System, where a Freeway
dead-ends into another Freeway, as is the intersection
of 1-70 with I-15 at Cove Fort Interchange and this is
of great significance because of the traffic pattern set
up by the joinder of the two Freeway Systems and the
greatly increased traffic flow. It is anticipated that the
greater part of the traffic from I-70 will head Soufa
toward California, rather than North toward Salt Lake
City ( H-28). I-15 through Beaver County is expected
lo be completed by December 31, 1970 and I-70 is expected to be completed by December, 1972 (Exhibit
22).

The construction of the Freeway represents the
single, most important event in the history of Beaver
County in the last 20 years ( H-28) .
The Pine Creek Interchange with which this lawsuit is concerned, is the first interchange on I-15, lo-
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cated a few miles South of the North Beaver Counlr
line. The average daily traffic flow along I-15, 011 th.e
completed leg of the Freeway between Beaver City au<l
Pine Creek Interchange, is 2,685 vehicles ( approximately one-half in each direction) and it is estimated
that this represents a total of approximately 7,500 persons using the Freeway each day. Two times as many
people use the Freeway each day as the present population of Beaver County. It is estimated by studies conducted by the State Road Commission that the average
daily traffic in 1975 will be 5,800 vehicles or an average
of 15,000 persons using the Freeway each day (Exhibit
20), (R-120-1).
Millard County, on the North, has no County Zoning Ordinance and Iron County, on the South, has a
Zoning Ordinance almost identical to the Resolution
adopted by Beaver County. In fact, the Resolution
used in Beaver County was copied from the Resolution
in Iron County ( R-378-9) but Iron County has zoned
all of their interchanges as "highway service" (Exhibit
3), (H-10-12).

POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I. THE ZONING RESOLUTION
OF BEAVER COUNTY CONFISCATES
THE PLAINTIFFS' PROPER TY BY PREVENTING ANY ECONOMIC USE THEREOF AND VIOLATES BOTH THE STATE
AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. -···········
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POINT II. THE ZONING ORDINANCE
IS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE, DISCRIMINATORY AND VOID AS APPLIED
TO THE PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY.
A. THE PINE CHEEK INTERCHANGE
IS THE BEST LOCATION ALONG I-15
lN BEA VER COUNTY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HIGH,VAY
SERVICE ZONE. -----·--·------·---------·----··--------·-··
B. THERE IS A PRESENT NEED FOR
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HIGH\V AY SERVICE ZONE AT PINE
CHEEK INTERCHANGE. -----------------------·-C. THE EFFECT OF THE PRESENT
ZONING RESOLUTION IS TO REGULATE AND RESTRICT BUSINESS
AND TO CREATE A MONOPOLY AT
BEA VER CITY. -------------------------·-------------------D. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
HIGI-nVAY SERVICE ZONE AT PINE
CREEK INTERCHANGE "\VILL INCREASE THE TAX BASE OF BEA VER
COUNTY AND HAVE NO MEASURABLE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT GPON THE COUNTY OR ANY OF THE
INCORPORATED CITIES.-----------------·-----POINT III. THE ZONING RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ON MAY 18,
19.:rn, IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
OX ITS FACE AND EVIDENCES ABUSE
OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
BOARD OF COGNTY COMMISSIONERS ...
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POINT IV. THE ZONING RESOLUTION AS ADOPTED BY BEAVER COUNTY HAS THE EFFECT OF INTERFERING lVITH AND BEING A BURDEN ON
INTERSTATE COMMERCE. ---------------------------ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER COUNTY CONFISCATES THE PLAHiTIFFS' PROPERTY BY PREVENTING AXY
ECONOMIC USE THEREOF AND YIOLATES BOTH THE STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS.
Mr. Elwood Corry, who was qualified as an Appraiser, testified at the trial that the value of the ground.
as presently zoned for grazing, was worth $20 to $30 per
acre, or the total value for the approximately 50 acrei
owned by the Plaintiffs and Chevron, was approximately $1,500. If the property were zoned for highway
service, it was worth approximately $10,000 per acre.
or a total value for the approximately 50 acres wa1
$500,000 (R-104-5). Mr. Corry stated .....a that the
appraisal of the ground zoned for grazing was based
upon the fact that it would take approximately 70 acre1
to graze one cow and one cow would have one calf per
year.
Substantially the same testimony was given by
another Appraiser, John Bushnell, at the hearing be·
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fore the County Commission. He appraised the proverty as zoned for grazing at approximately $50 per
acre and at $10,000 per acre when zoned for highway
service ( H-68-9) .
No greater illustration of extremes could be fouud,

if you deliberately set out to look for them. Under present zoning, the combined acreage of the Plaintiffs an<l

Chevron cannot even graze one cow for a year and so
for all intents and purposes, the ground is worthle,,s,
hut if zoned as highway service, it is valued at $500,00U.
The law on this point, supporting Plaintiffs' positio1:,
has been extensively cited in Chevron's well-written briti'
"ith which we concur. Accordingly, we will not undertake a lengthy dissertation of the law in this brief.
\Ve <lo, however, particularly refer the Court to the
case of Arvene Bay, etc. vs. 1'hatcher, 15 N.E. 2d 587
(noted in 117 A.L.R. 1117, 1130) which is cited i11
Chevron's brief at page 10. We also call the Court's
attention to the case of LaSalle National Bank of Chicago vs. 1'he County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, which in\'olved a factual situation very similar to the instant
case. In that case, the Court stated ( 69-70) :
"No one factor is controlling. It is not the
mere loss in value alone that is significant, but
the fact that the public welfare does not require
the restriction and resulting loss. 'Vhen it is
shown that no reasonable basis of public welfare
requires the limitation or restriction and resulting loss, the ordinance fails and the presumption
of rnlidity is dissipated. The law does not re-
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quire that the subject property be totally unsuitable for the purpose classified but it is sufficient
that a substantial decrease in value results trom
a classification bearing no substantial relation tu
the public welfare."
The action of the Beaver County Commission 1,
flagrantly confiscatory and violates both the State and
Federal Constitutions.

POINT II
THE ZONING ORDINANCE IS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE, DISCRIMINATORY AND VOID AS APPLIED TO THE
PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY.
A. THE PINE CREEK INTERCHANGE
IS THE BEST LOCATION ALONG I-15
IN BEAVER COUNTY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HIGHWAY SERVICE ZONE.
The Pine Creek Interchange is the number one spot
in the county for the establishment of a Highway Service Zone (D-35). All of the witnesses concurred with
this statement. This interchange is located approximatelv 20 miles North of Beaver City, almost to the
Beav;r County line; it has excellent visibility from botl1
directions and the diamond shaped interchange focili
tates easy off and on for highway traffic.
10

Even Mr. I. Dale Despain, who is a consulting
plauner by occupation, who was called on behalf of tl 1e
Defendants and the person who wrote the Zoning Hesolulion for Heaver County, admitted:
"Q. N ?W, then is?'t it true, in your opinion,
that theres no question that along 1-15 in l3eaYer County, as it now exists, that there is 110
better place for the establishment of highway
seri;ice facilities, as such, no more logical place
for the establishment of them than at the Pine
Creek Interchange?
"A. That's a logical location if it's to be. lf it
should be, that's a logical location.
"Q. If zoning permitted, it would be the ideal
location I-15, would it not?
"A. Yes." (R-367)
.Mr. Ralph Strong, Real Estate Agent, for Phillips Petroleum Company stated:

"Now, Beaver, you sell a lot of gasoline, a lot
of petroleum products in this town. Because it
is a natural stopping place. We're about 200,
220 miles from Salt Lake City. 'Ve're 250 miles
from Las Vegas. "'Then the interstate system
is completed the Pine Creek Interchange will be
the natural stopping place for these customers,
so if you gentlemen let facilities in there, yo~1
will - the facilities will do a tremendous business and of course Beaver County will benefit.
If you do not let facilities in the;e, these interstate travelers will trade in the next county
or in the first county they come to where they
can have easy off and on to the interstate." (H30)
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Mr. Owen W. Burnham, who is the City Planner
for Ogden City, Utah, called on behalf of the Plaintiffs
to testify, stated with respect to this particular location:

''Q. 'Vhere, in your opinion, is the best place
in all of lleaver County for the establishment of
a highway service zope? ...
"A. Yes. As I have studied this to the extent
that I have, I believe what has been referred to
as the Pine Creek Interchange would be the
mos~ logical and the best location for a highway
service zone in the county.
"Q. Does it meet all of the qualifications in
your best judgment1 I mean, all of the qualifications as stated in the highway service zone ob·
jectives on Page 4;3 of the ordinance, does it
meet those objectives and characteristics of the
highway service zone?

"A. Yes , !think it meets it in all respects."
(R-215-6)
B. THERE IS A PRESENT NEED FOR
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HIGHWAY SERVICE ZONE AT PINE CREEK
INTERCHANGE.
The evidence presented at both the hearing before
the Board of County Commissioners and the trial is
undisputed as to the habits of the traveling public on the
Freeway. Such persons will simply not be inconven·
ienced. Mr. Ralph Strong summed up the extensiw
research that his company had made regarding the
habits of the users of Freeways with these words:
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"Now, Phillips has had a lot of experience in
the interstate locations. \Ve were one of the first
companies to recognize that our traveling customer, the traveling public, will not be mconvenienced. They will not pull off the interstate
system and go through these towns and buck these
towns, to get service, and of course that's why
the interstate system was recommended and approved and is being built. It's so the tourists,
the motoring public will not be inconvenienced
to make a nice straight shot at their destination.
" ... we found our customer won't even pull off
the interstate if there is more than one scnice
station at an interchange, they will trade at the
service station that is closer to the interchai1ge.
They won't go another 100 yards or whatever
au<l be inconvenienced that much, just a few
seconds." ( H-28-29)

:Jlr. Uon Major, an official of the Pacific Intermountain Express trucking line, was called on behalf
of the Plaintiffs at the hearing before the County Commissioners. He stated that trucks require a stop about
every 100 miles, in order to refuel and as rest stops for
their drivers, but they do not permit trucks to go into
'mall towns for fuel and services, because of the delays
encountered and the resulting high expense involved in
payroll and tying up their equipment. He explained
that trucking companies desire to keep their big trucks
out of downtown areas, because of the traffic hazards
ancl sat'ety factors. ( H-58-9) . He also pointed out
that all of the large truck lines have established fueling
'itol1s, so that a trucker knows the location where he will
buy fuel, before he leaves his terminal (H-61). He also
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...
stated that, in his opm10n, because of the strategica
location of the Pine Creek Interchange, it could deyeJo1
into a natural truck stop (H-62). Mr. Major's testi.
mony is unrefuted.
There is no question but that there preseHtly exist.1
a need for a highway service zone at Pine Creek luter
change. This testimony was not refuted or contradicted.
Mr. Kent D. Elwell, a partner in the firm of Economic
and Planners Research Associates, of Salt Lake City,
called to testify on behalf of the Plaintiffs, explaine1l
the need of Pine Creek Interchange in these words:
"Q. Have your s1udies of the Interchange
State Svstem indicated how often or at what dis·
tance h~ghway service facilities should be made
available to the traveling public?

"A. Highway service facilities, perhaps, ever)
twenty-five to thirty miles is a general guide
line that is published by the Bureau of Publir
Roads.
"Q. Do you have an opinion, Mr. Elwell, m
to the need for highway services presently al
the Pine Creek Interchange?

"A. I do.
"Q. "\Vill you state your opinion?

"A. I think that the traffic volumes that haw
already been cited, the fact that you have ap·
proximately 8,000 persons t~aveling only one
way, which could be in the ne1ghborhood of !6:
000 people going both wa~s per day, .cert.a1~h
indicates a need for some highway service facil 1•
ties at the Pine Creek area. As a matter of fact.
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that represents almost four times the number of
residents in Beaver County, does it not?" (ll139)

Dr. Milton Matthews, Professor at the School of
Business of the University of Utah, who was called to
le:,tify concerning the economic condition of Beaver
County, also stated that his economic studies indicated
a present need for highway service facilities at Pine
Creek Interchange (D-36).

C. THE EFFECT OF' THE PHESENT
ZONING RESOLUTION IS TO REGULA TE AND RESTRICT BUSINESS AND
TO CREATE A MONOPOLY AT BEAVER
CITY.
That the County Planing Commission and the
Board of County Commissioners were motivated by financial interest and a desire to control and restrict competition to the existing business in Beaver City is at
once apparent. The zoning resolution was a deliberate
attempt to force the freeway traveler to leave the freeway and patronize the existing businesses in Beaver
City. The actual effect of the zoning resolution is to
control competition and prevent the establishment of
businesses at better locations elsewhere in the county.
Mr. I. Dale Despain (the Defendants' own witness) admitted, on cross-examination:
"Q. Well, now, you have testified that, and
it appears to be one of the theories that you have
used, and correct me if I'm wrong, that by not
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zoning highway service you can get the tran~ler.1
to leave the Interstate Highway and come a
quarter of a mile, half a mile, into the center ol
Heaver City to buy their products and to recein
the serYices they need as highway tnffelcrs, h
that right?
"A. I'm sure that if there were no other high.
way facilities other than at Beaver that then
would be more of the highway people come into
Beaver to get their services than otherwise.
"Q. And that's the reason it was zoned the way
it was zoned, is that right?
·

"A. And that was one of the reasons.
"Q. Hut you would admit' wouldn't you, that
it would certainly be more in keeping with corn
mercial development and more in keeping witl1
convenience to the public to have a highway ser·
vice area right immediately at an interchange~

"A. If we were concerucd only with the high·
way service users, yes, highway users, not ser·
vices.
"Q. Now, you admitted that Pine Creek rep·
resents prob~bily the ideal location for a high
way service location if one were to be selected 11
Beaver County, isn't that right, the Interchaugr
at Pine Creek?
1

"A. It is one of the logical locations.
"MR. CHRISTIAXSEN: Object. Ht
did not admit it was the ideal. He said I'
was a logical "MR. BETTIL YON: I have no objcc
tion to that wording." (R-391-2)
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A few minutes later, Mr. Despain said:
"Q. But if Beaver City were not here then
it wouldn't make any difference if Pine' Creel~
were zoned, would it, were zoned highway service?

"A. Oh, I think if Beaver City and there were
no other comparable communities along the hig.hway affected with it, that it would be logical."
(R-393)
Mr. Owen ~r. Burnham, testifying on behalf of the
Plaintiffs, stated his opinion as to the effect of the }kaver County Zoning Resolution, as follows:
"Q. Now, specifically with regard to the zoning resolution in Beaver County, you have read
this resolution, I presume?

"A. Yes.
"Q. You're familiar with iU

"A. Yes.
"Q. Now, what is the actual effect of a zoning
resolution such as we have in Beaver County that
restricts all business to the area close by the
incorporated centers?

"A. 'i\T ell, on the face of it, in answer to the
question directly, I believe the effect, of 12ourse,
is to force any business that's to be conducted
to be conducted there and as such certainly tends,
or directly causes a monopoly situation.
"Q. What's fundamentally wrong with such a
zoning concept?

"A. 'i\T ell, I have never believed that the purpose of zoning was to foster or promote or per-
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petuate monopolies as such. I don't believe that
the. statute authori:ws a city or a county to use
zonmg as a tool to perpetuate monopoly or tu
institute it." (R-202-3)
·
The Defendant proffered no evidence indicating
that the effect of the zoning resolution was anything
but to regulate business within the County of Beam
and to establish a monopoly at Beaver City, by predud·
ing the development of any competitive enterprise at
the Pine Creek Interchange or elsewhere.
The zoning resolution was proposed in contempla·
tion of the eventual construction of the freeway and
after the decision was made, the resolution itself was
hastily prepared. Mr. I. Dale Despain admitted ou
cross-examination that it was copied from the zoning
resolution of Iron County ( R-378-9). No comprehensive zoning plan was ever undertaken. The Planning
Commission does not hold regular meetings but meets
only as items are presented to them for consideration.
No effort has been made to study the changing conditions and, in particular, the effect that the freeway has
made or the effect that the freeway will have on Beaver
County after its completion.
It is clear from the evidence presented, that the
resolution was conceived and has been used since its
inception to aid existing businesses in Beaver City. Its
purpose and effect is to preclude any competition with
Beaver City and thereby create a monopoly, and this
despite the .fact that Pine Creek Interchange is located
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~o miles North of Beaver City and that there is clearly
a present need for the construction of highway servic;;
facilities at that point.

D. THE ESTABLISHMENT O.F A HlGH\\'AY SERVICE ZONE AT PINE CREE1~
INTERCHANGE WILL INCREASE THE
TAX BASE OF BEAVER COUNTY AND
HAVE NO MEASURABLE DETlUMENTAL EFFECT UPON THE COUNTY OR
ANY OF THE INCORPORATED CITIES.
The population of Beaver County has decline<l
from 5,014 in the year 1940 to 4,200 in 1965. Dr . .Milton
Matthews stated, in his testimony, that retail sales in
Beaver County has increased 51 % from 1948 to 1953,
but retail sales for the entire State of Utah for the same
period have increased 110%. It is estimated that inflation over the past 15 years has increased sales by approximately 40%, so that retail sales in Beaver County
han remained almost stable while the rest of the state
has increased approximately 50% above what would
normally be attributed to inflation (D-48). Dr . .Matthews also explained that 33% of the retail sales of BeaYer County were heavily oriented to highway traffic
and, as an illustration of this reliance upon the traveling
public, he noted that Beaver County has the highest per
capita of gas sales in all counties in the State of Utah,
South of Utah County (D-19-20).
It is not feasible nor is it to be expected that any
new service stations, motels or chain restaurants, will be
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constructed in Beaver City proper in the foreseeablt
future ( D-25-26, 30-32). This follows from the COii·
struction of I-15 and the eventual bypass of Bearer
City and not from the possible construction of facilitie1
in any other locality. This testimony was not refuted
by the Defendants; yet, in the face of these realities, fa
Beaver County Commission failed to do the very Uung
that would bolster the failing economy and increase !ht
tax base of Beaver County.
In contrast to this, the unrefuted testimony wa,
that the tax base of Beaver County would be substm:tially increased and strengthened by the constructio11
of proposed facilities at Pine Creek Interchange (R
218-9), (Exhibit 24).
The County Planning Commission stated their reasons for denying the application for zoning at Pine
Creek Interchange, as follows:

"The petitioners' lands approximately 20 mib
North of Beaver City would require an addi
tional cost to the County, providing additional
police and fire protection and other governmen·
tal services; that a commercial development at
that location to serve the traveling public woulo
seriously endanger the economic stability of the
existing communities in the County, particular])
Beaver City since its economic stability is heaY11'
dependent upon tourist business and the tax base
within the existing communities would thereb)
be endangered and that a commercial develop·
ment at the location of the petitioners' lands~
not necessary since all of the services which i'. 1'
anticipated would be provided at the new locat101
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are pres~1!t1Y. available in or near the existing
commumhes m the County and there is s1)ace iu
or near the existing communities of the County
for the construction of additional like facilities."
(Exhibit 17, Minutes of the Planning Commission l\Ieeting held October H, 1965).
Each of these contentions was refuted at the trial
an<l no evidence was submitted by Defendants to support any of the delineated reasons for denying Plaintiffs' application for wning change. As a matter of
fact, the zoning resolution will not accomplish any legitimate objective whatsoever. See the testimony of Dr.
::\Iilton Matthews (R-210-227). Accordingly, the commissioners stated reasons for denying the Plaintiffs'
zoning applications were nothing more than feeble excuses to effect the illegal purpose of controlling and
regulating business by means of the zoning ordinance.
The evidence at the hearing before the County
Commissioners and the evidence at the trial was m·crwhelmingly to the effect that any economic detriment
that might come to Beaver County would be directly
related to the construction of the freeway and the resulting bypass of Beaver City. All of the evidence indicated that Pine Creek Interchange, which is 20 miles
North of Beaver City, was too remote to affect Beaver
City. Many of the witnesses pointed out that one-half
of the vehicles (north bound) had already passed Beaver City and the construction at Pine Creek Interchange
gave the County one more opportunity to gain "export
dollars" for the traveling public.
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The case of Naylor vs. Salt Lake City, 17 Ctah
2d 300; 410 P2d 764<, cited in Chevron's Brief, sets forth
the foundational reason for zoning but none of these
reasons or objectives are met in the resolution in question. It is clear that the zoning resolution is arbilrnrr.
unreasonable, discriminatory an<l void, as applied tu the
Plaintiffs' property. It represents a flagrant abuse of
the police power.

POINT Ill
THE ZONING RESOLUTION ADOPTED
BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIOKERS ON MAY 18, 1959, IS ARBITRARY AXD
CAPRICIOUS ON I'l'S FACE AND E\'J.
DENCES ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY CO}lMISSIONERS.
The Court will observe that in Article I of the
resolution, page 2, (Exhibit 1), the legislatively deter·
mined purposes of the resolution are set forth with
reference being made to "each of the zones" ostensibly
made in accordance with a "comprehensive plan." Next
it is observed that purpose No. 10 is "to protect both
urban and non-urban development." In the declaration
( 1-3) on page 2, reference is again made to "each of
the zones" the "due and careful consideration" givm
among other things, to "the 1mitability of the land for
particular uses" and to "the character of the zone with
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a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraying the most appropriate nse of land thronghout the
county." (Emphasis added.)
On page 27 of the zoning resolution the county is
hereby divided into zones" as set forth. Zone HS-1
Highway Service Zone is specifically created. Thus, the
necessity of a Highway Service Zone was legislatively
determined.
Additionally, "the location and boundaries of each
of the zones" are stated in Paragraph 7-2 of Article
YU to be "shown on the ZONE MAP OF BEAVER
COUNTY, UTAH." The map is specifically made
part of the resolution.
Thus, all of the zones are legislatively established,
with reference being made to each of them, which zones
are shown on the ZONE MAP, all pursuant to the
legislatively determined needs and purposes as set forth
on page 2 of the resolution.
Now turning to the Highway Service Zone on page
43 of the resolution, we find set forth the legislatively
determined, "General Objectives and Characteristics"
of this zone. Included in the General Objectives and
Characteristics of the Highway Service Zone is the
following:
"In general, the H-1 Zones are. located along
Interstate Highways, several miles from any
established communities where service facilities
are required to meet the needs of the traveling
public."
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It is noted that the very <lescription of the ff
Zone amounts to a legislative recognition that sucl
zones and "service facilities are required to meet th
needs of the traveling public.'' (Emphasis added.)
The six objectives of the Highway Zone are spec.
fically set forth among which is to "protect urban dt
velopment." It is noted that the Highway Service Zan
is the only zone having as one of its declared purpost
the protection of urban development.
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, the Hoar,
of County Commissioners, contrary to the expre1·
declaration of the resolution, contrary to the legislati11
recognition that such zones and service facilities m
required to meet the needs of the traveling public, con
trary to the express legislatively determined purpost
of the ordinance and contrary to the legislative deter
mination that highway service zones would protel'
urban development, failed and refused to allocate an.:
land whatsoever to that zone .
1

The inconsistency of the zoning resolution is all
the more amplified by the testimony of the Defendant·
own witness, Dale Despain, who testified on cross ex
amination with respect to the needs of the travelini
public ( R-359-360). He also testified on cross-exa1111
nation that the protection of "urban development" wa·
a paramount objective of the ordinance (R. 365). It
Dale Despain' s testimony as to this "paramount objec
tive" of the ordinance be true (and it can't be true
for if it were, land would have been allocated h
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the Highway Service Zone), then it was even more
flagrant for Beaver County to fail to allocate any
land to the Highway Service Zone, since that zow'
is the only zone having as one of its expressed purposes the protection of urban development.
It is at once apparent that the zoning resolution
is a sham; that the Beaver County Commission confused "regulation of business" with "protection of urban
development" and, that motivated by the former, it
passed the ordinance for that specific, but unlawful
purpose-to preclude the development of any business
at the Pine Creek Interchange that would be competitiYe with the desired monopoly in Beaver City.

If Beaver County were bona fide in its desire to
provide highway service zones and service facilities "to
meet the needs of the traveling public" it would certainly have allocated the ideal spot in Beaver County
for that purpose rather than refusing to make any allocation at all.
If Beaver County really wanted to protect "urban
development" and thereby accomplish a declared purpose of the ordinance, it would have proceeded to
allocate land to the Highway Service Zone, as it had
already legislaitvely determined to be proper by the
creation of that zone for the purposes indicated. Indeed,
the only way this purpose could have been accomplished
was by the creation of a Highway Service Zone. This
was e~plained by Owen Burnham, when he stated:
25

"\Vell, as I stated, I believe that with the Interstate Highway, you are dealing with a new
factor, a new problem which is different than
other highways and is different than the proLlem of existing urban <levelupment as such. I
believe that you have here the users of this facility which are going through or possibly going to
stop in the county. Probably a majority of them
will be going through and if you do not allow
the establishment of service facilities, the count\'
will lose forever the potential revenue which the)·
could gain from this through direct and indirect
taxes, and as a result of this, to raise their neces·
sary revenues they will then have to tax the residents, the property, and the residents of the
county to raise this lost revenue." (R-217-218.)
Accordingly, by failing to create a Highway Service
Zone, Beaver County is, in effect, actually frustrating
urban development, an<l the ordinance, on its face, is
contradictory, and defeats the accomplishment of the
express, legislatively determined, purposes for which
it was adopted.
Furthermore, it is noted that in purpose No. 1 of
the resolution as set forth on page 20 thereof, that the
said resolution is limited in scope to the "inhabitants
of Beaver County," whereas Section 17 -27-13, Vtah
Code Annotated, 1953, provides tlw following:
"Such regulations shall be designed and enacted for the purpose of promoting the health,
safety, morals, conyenience, order, prosperity or
welfare of the present and future inhabitants of
the State of Utah ... "
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Thus the ordinance on its face is limited in scope
io the inhabitants of Beaver County in the face of
enabling legislation permitting the adoption of the
zoning resolution, which enabling legislation requires
that the "present and future inhabitants of the State
of l! tah" be considered. The ordinance accordingly
fails ,on its face, to meet an essential statutory requirement.
The evil that results from the failure of the ordinance to meet the indicated statutory requirement is
of considerable consequence in the face of the reality
that the average daily flow of traffic along I-15, on
the completed leg of the Freeway between Beaver City
and the Pine Creek Interchange, is 2,685 vehicles,
representing approximately 7,500 persons using the
freeway each day. This is nearly twice the population
of Beaver County. As a matter of fact, it is estimated
by studies conducted by the State Road Commissi011
that the average daily traffic in 1975 will be 5,800
vehicles, or an average of 1,500 persons using the Freeway each day. (Exhibit 20), (R-120-121).

POINT NO. IV
THE ZONING RESOLUTION AS ADOPTED BY BEA VER COUNTY HAS THE EFFECT OF INTERFERING lVITH AND BEING A BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
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The testimony bearing on this point is undisputed.
At the time of the trial, there were some 2,685 vehicles
per day passing through Pine Creek Interchange.
(Exhibit 20.)
This volume of traffic is expected to increase to
5,800 vehicles by 1975, or an average of 15,000 persons
per day. (Exhibit 20). Much of the traffic is interstate
traffic.
The evidence is undisputed that the traveling
public insists on staying on the Freeway, and is reluctant
to depart therefrom. See the testimony of Ralph Strong
(H-28-31); the testimony of \\Tilliam McKenzie (R
39-40); the testimony of Kent Elwell ( R-123) ; the
testimony of Dr. Milton Matthews ( B-23 et seq.); and
even the testimony of the Defendant's witness, Dale
Despain (R-123-124-359-360). As a matter of fact.
Dale Despain conceded that the traveling public would
consider itself burdened to be forced to leave the freeway to obtain the benefit of highway service facilities
(R-123-124).
"\iVhile the zoning resolution does not directly im·
pede the interstate movement of traffic on l-15 through
Beaver County, the evil of the ordinance is at once
apparent insofar as this traffic is concerned. Beaver
County, determined to regulate business and preclude
the development of highway oriented facilities along
the interstate, deliberately zoned the whole of the county
with no land being allocated whatsoever for highway
28

service zones, all in a determined effort to force traffic
from the Freeway into Beaver City to secure those
services normally expected and anticipated in the
proximity of the Freeway itself. The zoning ordinance,
therefore, interferes with interstate traffic and casts
an undue burden on those who travel the freeway. The
traveling public, of course, must have the benefit of
highway oriented facilities and services. The need of
gasoline products, food and personal services is obvious.
Such highway oriented facilities are more normally
<leveloped with the highway system, and would be expected to develop along or near the arterial freeways
of this nation as they come into existence. If all of the
counties in this western part of the United States
through which the freeways run were to follow the
example of Beaver County, it is at once apparent that
an interstate traveler would be denied the very benefit
the freeways were intended to afford. Instead of being
able to acquire, in the proximity of the Freeway, goods
and services which he must have as he travels, the
traveler would be required to interrupt his journey,
depart from the freeway, and go into the small communities to obtain needed services, all because of a
determined effort to require the patronization of vested
business interests in these communities.
Accordingly, the actual effect of the action of
Beaver County in adopting the zoning resolution is
to interfere with and burden Interstate Commerce. If
this court were to uphold the resolution and declare
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the same to be valid, such would be an invitation to
every county in the State of Utah, and beyond, to follow
suit.
Our research discloses no zoning case directly in point,
but this is not surprising in view of the recency of the
development of our arterial freeway system throughout
the \Vest. The applicable law and guidelines in analoguous situations are, however, well established. The
regulation of interstate commerce is within the provime
of Congress, and no state, county, or municipality ca11
unreasonably interfere with or burden the same. Interstate Buses Corp. vs. Holyoke Street R. Co., 47 S. Ct.
298, 273, U. S. 45, 71 L. ed. 530 (1926); Southerland
vs. St. Croix Taxicab Association,, 315 F. 2d 364 (3rd
Cir. 1963). See also the following annotations: 36 ALR
lllO, s. 38 ALR 291, 47 ALR 230, 49 ALR 1203,
62 ALR 52, 85 ALR 1136, 109 ALR 1245, 135 ALR
1358; 86 ALR 281; 121 ALR 568, 75 L. ed 954, s.
92 L. ed 109, and 97 L. ed 573; 97 L. ed 176, s. 2 L. ea
2d 2090. Also see 15 C.J.S. Commerce, Sec. 71 (I!
p. 639; and also 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and High·
way Traffic, Sec. 21, P. 613, and 15 Am. Jur. 2d
Commerce, Sec. 18, p. 648, Sec. 17, p. 647, Sec. 69,
p. 714-716, and Sec. 79, p. 723.
There is no single concept of interstate commerc<
which can be applied to every issue. McLeod vs. Threl·
keld, 319 U.S. 491, 495, 63 S. Ct. 1348, 87 L. ed. 1538.
1542 (1943); Southerland vs. St. Croix Taxicab As·
sociation, 315 F. 2d 364 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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Each case must be viewed on its own peculiar
facts. Southerland vs. St. Croix Taxicab Association,
315 F. 2d 364 (3rd Cir. 1963).
The reasonableness of the county's action insofar
as it affects interstate commerce is certainly an appropriate subject of inquiry. Hendrick vs. Maryla;id,
23V U.S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140, 59 L. ed. 385 ( 1914).
SUMMARY
The zoning resolution of Beaver County, as applied to Plaintiffs' property, contiscates it and violates
rights guaranteed by both the State and .Federal Constitutions. In addition the zoning ordinance is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, and void as applied
to the plaintiffs' property. The Pine Creek Interchange
is the best location along I-15 in Beaver County for
the establishment of a highway service zone. The failure
to allow the development of a highway oriented facility
at this interchange thwarts the development of Beaver
County and is nothing more than an overt attempt to
regulate and restrict business and to create a monopoly
at the City of Beaver. Furthermore, the zoning resolution adopted by the Board of County Commissioners
is, on its face, arbitrary and capricious, and evidences
an abuse of discretion on the part of the Board of
County Commissioners. Furthermore, the zoning resolution has the added effect of interfering with and being
a burden on interstate commerce.
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Accordingly, this court should reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case with directions to make and enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment consistent with the foregoing
and as prayed for in the Plaintiffs' complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
BETTIL YON & HOW ARD
By: Verden E. Bettilyon
McKAY AND BURTON
By: Macoy A. McMurray
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants

32

